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CROP INSURANCE FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATIONS:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
CHAD G. MARZEN*
Rather fail with honor than succeed by fraud.
–Sophocles1
INTRODUCTION
Fraud has been the proverbial thorn in the side of honest and
trustworthy transactions and business for centuries. As demonstrated by
the above quotation of the great Greek writer Sophocles, fraud has been
a significant issue for hundreds of years. Whether motivated by financial
greed, desire for success, or some other motivation, individuals from all
backgrounds and walks of life have either actively misrepresented or
purposefully omitted material facts in their transactions with other in-
dividuals or entities in order to receive some pecuniary or other gain. One
need only watch an episode of “American Greed”2 in order to identify the
latest iteration on an all-too-common theme.
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Many types of fraud involve financial schemes. One, the infamous
Ponzi scheme,3 became infamous in the 1920s4 and has reappeared in sub-
sequent decades. Within the past decade, Ponzi schemes have seemingly
increased in number and frequency in the wake of the crisis in the global
financial system in the late 2000s and general economic downturn in the
United States.5 Other forms of financial fraud have become widely notori-
ous in recent years, such as medical billing fraud,6 tax fraud,7 real estate
3 Samuel P. Rothschild, Note, Bad Guys in Bankruptcy: Excluding Ponzi Schemes from
the Stockbroker Safe Harbor, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1383 (2012) (defining a Ponzi
scheme as “an investment scheme not actually supported by an underlying business
venture. The scheme promises large returns and initial investors receive them, attracting
further investors. But these initial returns are false profits . . .”).
4 R. Alexander Pilmer & Mark T. Cramer, Swindlers’ List, L.A. LAW, June 2009, at 24
(“The Ponzi scheme’s namesake, Carlo ‘Charles’ Ponzi, was an Italian immigrant who, in
the 1920s, solicited other immigrants to invest their life savings with him. Ponzi falsely
claimed that his investors’ money would be used to buy international postal coupons that
he could resell for a 100 percent profit. Ponzi convinced his investors that he was able to
earn substantial profits by exploiting differences in international currency exchange rates.
In fact, the only thing Ponzi exploited was his investors’ trust because he was not actually
using their money to purchase postal coupons and, therefore, would not earn any return on
their investments. Instead, he used the money he received from new investors to pay the
returns he had promised to earlier investors. Although Ponzi convinced more than 20,000
people to invest $10 million, an audit of Ponzi’s assets after the scheme collapsed turned
up less than $100 worth of postal coupons.”).
5 Rochschild, supra note 3, at 1384 (stating, “[i]ndeed, the economic downturn has exposed
an increasing number of Ponzi schemes. Authorities uncovered nearly four times as many
Ponzi schemes in 2009 as in 2008, and many remain undetected. One study estimates that
in the first half of 2011 alone, authorities uncovered fifty-one Ponzi schemes accounting
for $837 million in alleged damages. Startlingly, Ponzi schemes have generally grown in
magnitude over time.”).
6 Pamela C. Enslen & Matthew F. Leitman, Health Care Fraud Enforcement, FED. LAW.,
June 2010, at 29 (“Another major area of focus is billing fraud, which could include any
of the following: billing phantom patients or patients who are deceased; billing for services
never provided; billing for old services as if they were new; billing for extra hours or un-
necessary tests; billing for equipment that is medically unnecessary, whether or not it is
provided; billing for personal expenses; overbilling or double-billing for services; or up-
coding or unbundling of services”).
7 Marcus Schoenfeld, A Critique of the Internal Revenue Service’s Refusal to Disclose How
it “Determined” a Tax Deficiency, and of the Tax Court’s Acquiescence With This View, 33
IND. L. REV. 517, 519 (2000) (“Federal income tax fraud consists of two types: criminal and
civil. The elements of the two types of tax fraud are identical; only the degree of the re-
quired proof, and the possible consequences differ. The elements of fraud include: 1. wil-
fully making a knowing falsehood; 2. an underpayment; and; 3. an intent to evade.”).
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fraud—especially during the height of the real estate “bubble,”8 commodi-
ties fraud9—and even alleged fraud by attorneys.10
The issues of fraud and misrepresentations have historically been,
and currently are, no stranger to the field of insurance. In some extreme
cases, individuals may resort to the crime of arson in order to fraudulently
recover insurance proceeds.11 In the area of automobile insurance, staged
collisions and exaggerated injury claims also constitute fraudulent claims.12
In the area of life insurance, cases of viatical settlement fraud13 and of
allegedly faking deaths in order to obtain life insurance proceeds have
been reported.14 In the application process generally, misrepresentations
in applications and supporting documents in order to obtain insurance
coverage are utilized by insurers in order to defend against recovery of
benefits on claims.15
8 John E. Campbell & Oliver Beatty, Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.: Consumer
Prey, Corporate Predators, and a Call for the Death of the Voluntary Payment Doctrine
Defense, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 501, 524 (2012) (describing the fraud in the real estate market
during the late 2000s).
9 Harry B. Borders, Note, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder as Applied to Commodities Fraud:
No Intent Required, 79 KY. L.J. 369, 370–71 (1990–1991) (“It has been well established
that two of the elements of a commodities fraud claim are control by the broker over the
customer’s account excessive trading in light of the customer’s investment objectives”).
10 Vic Walter & Marc Shone, Scott Rothstein Gets 50 Years In $1.2 Billion Ponzi Scheme,
ABC NEWS (June 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/scott-rothstein-50-years-12-billion
-ponzi-scheme/story?id=10868086 (discussing the case of former Fort Lauderdale, Florida
attorney Scott Rothstein).
11 David L. Nersessian, Penalty by Proxy: Holding the Innocent Policyholder Liable for
Fraud by Coinsureds, Claims Professionals, and Other Agents, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 907, 914 (2003) (“Insurers often face fraudulent claims arising out of the
intentional destruction of insured property, where the insured deliberately destroys (or
procures another to destroy) insured property to realize the economic benefit of the in-
surance coverage on that property. Arson best exemplifies this type of loss.”).
12 Edward J. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and Its Effects on the Insurance
Industry, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 23, 25 (1997) (“Staged vehicle collisions are becoming one of
the top fraud schemes”).
13 Eli Martin Lazarus, Note, Viatical and Life Settlement Securitization: Risks and
Proposed Regulation, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 262 (2010) (“At different times, fraud
has infected every stage of the viatication and life settlement process. Viators have hidden
illnesses from insurers (sometimes with accomplices to stand in at physical examinations),
and healthy policyholders have conspired with physicians to fake serious illnesses, inflat-
ing settlement proceeds.”).
14 Julia Greenberg, N.Y. Man Charged, Accused of Faking Death in Insurance Scam,
CNN (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/justice/new-york-fake-death-insurance
/index.html.
15 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 713–14 (1988) (“When an
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The problems of fraud and misrepresentations are not foreign to
the area of crop insurance and the federal crop insurance program. Al-
though there is vast legal scholarship generally on insurance fraud,16 the
application for insurance contains false answers, it often leads to the issue of whether the
insured or third party beneficiaries should be able to recover benefits upon proof that the
applicant gave truthful answers that were incorrectly recorded by an intermediary (agent
or broker) or a medical examiner. Insurers have often defended claims in such cases on
the theory that the applicant is responsible for whatever appears in the application. This
defense is ordinarily supported by one or more of these arguments: (1) that the person
recording the answers was, in doing so, acting as the applicant’s agent and not as agent
for the insurer; (2) that the applicant’s opportunity to read the recorded answers before
signing makes the applicant responsible for their content, even if the applicant failed to
take advantage of that opportunity; and (3) if the application or a copy of it was attached
to the policy (or otherwise delivered to the policyholder), that the opportunity to read the
recorded answers at that subsequent time and to call the insurer’s attention to any discrep-
ancy makes the applicant responsible thereafter for the erroneous information provided
to the insurer.”).
16 Articles which address insurance fraud include the following: 1988: Michael Sean Quinn,
Closing Arguments in Insurance Fraud Cases, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 744 (1988); 1992: Boyd
Kimball Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
1 (1992); Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 907 (1992); 1993: Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Adjusters and Plaintiffs’
Attorneys: From Claims Fraud Consensus to Settlement Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 538
(1993); Frank E. Miller, Reclaiming Attorneys’ Fees Paid Out on Fraudulent Claims, 60
DEF. COUNS. J. 97 (1993); 1994: Daniel T. Fitzpatrick, Comment, Civil RICO and
Antitrust Law: The Uneven Playing Field of the Workers’ Compensation Fraud Game, 25
PACE L.J. 311 (1994); 1996: Robert R. Googins, Fraud and the Incontestable Clause: A
Modest Proposal for A Change, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 51 (1996); Lesley A. Hunter, Comment,
The Legal Prevention of Equine Insurance Fraud—How We Can Stop the Killing Game,
22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 845 (1996); Cathryn M. Little, Fighting Fire with Fire: “Reverse Bad
Faith” in First-Party Litigation Involving Arson and Insurance Fraud, 19 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 43 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1996); 1999: Guy William McRoskey, Comment, The Rule in a
Contribution Action Between Third-Party Insurers Wherein the Plaintiff Insurer Seeks
Reimbursement of Defense Costs from the Defendant Insurer After a Collusive Fraud on
the Plaintiff Insurer Under California Law, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 797 (1999); 2000: Bruce
R. Fox, Technology: The New Weapon in the War on Insurance Fraud, 67 DEF. COUNS.
J. 237 (2000); 2001: Chad A. Hester, Note, Are Forensic Locksmiths Really Qualified to
Testify As Experts in Cases of Insurance Fraud?: An Examination of the Admissibility of
Forensic Locksmith Opinions Under Rule 702, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357 (2001); Louis J.
Papa & Anthony Basile, No-Fault Insurance Fraud: An Overview, 17 TOURO L. REV. 611
(2001); 2002: Keith J. Crocker & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims
Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & ECON. 469 (2002); Mark K. Delegal, Florida No-Fault
Insurance Reform: A Step in the Right Direction, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031 (2002);
Francis J. Mootz III, The Sounds of Silence: Waiting for Courts to Acknowledge that
Public Policy Justifies Awarding Damages to Third-Party Claimants When Liability
Insurers Deal with Them in Bad Faith, 2 NEV. L.J. 443 (2002); 2006: Curt A. Benson,
Persuading and Dissuading: The Degree of Proof in Insurance Fraud Cases, 23 T.M.
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specific issues of crop insurance fraud and misrepresentations remain
largely unexplored among law review articles.17 In an era of tough finan-
cial budgets and a delicate economic recovery in the United States, fraud
in the federal crop insurance program has been estimated to cost taxpayers
in the millions of dollars.18 Despite efforts by both private crop insurers
and the federal government to combat fraud associated with claims in the
program, crop insurance fraud and misrepresentations associated with
crop insurance policies remains a significant issue of national concern.19
This Article, as a follow up to an article examining the legal issues
concerning crop insurance bad faith liability,20 offers a comprehensive ex-
amination of contemporary legal issues concerning the issue of crop in-
surance fraud and misrepresentations. Part I provides an overview of the
contemporary problem of fraud in crop insurance and discusses the re-
sponses of both private insurers and the federal government to curb and
combat waste, fraud, and abuse in the program. Part II explores the vari-
ety of legal remedies to combat crop insurance fraud and misrepresenta-
tions among reported cases. In criminal law, the possibility of substantial
criminal sentences, of up to 30 years in prison, and criminal prosecutions
of crop insurance fraud serve as a deterrence to the commission of acts of
fraud. However, remedies for crop insurance fraud are not limited to crim-
inal prosecutions alone. Misrepresentations in applications for crop insur-
ance, particularly the misrepresentations of actual interests in crops, have
led to cases where insureds cannot recover for damages due to covered
causes of losses. In addition to rescission and voidance of insurance policies
COOLEY L. REV. 503 (2006); Robert E. Hoyt, David B. Mustard & Lawrence S. Powell, The
Effectiveness of State Legislation in Mitigating Moral Hazard: Evidence from Automobile
Insurance, 49 J.L. & ECON. 427 (2006); 2007: John W. Leardi, Clarifying a Post-Payment
Audit Fiction: Why Inadequate Clinical Records are Not a Per Se Violation of the New
Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 287 (2007); Johnny
Parker, Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent’s Financial Abuse of an Elderly
Client, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 683 (2007); 2009: Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E.
Appel, Common-Sense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the
Good Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477 (2009).
17 See, e.g., David F. Rendahl, Comment, Federal Crop Insurance: Friend or Foe?, 4 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 185 (1994); Christopher R. Kelley, The Agricultural Risk Protection
Act of 2000: Federal Crop Insurance, the Non-Insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program,
and the Domestic Commodity and Other Farm Programs, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141 (2001).
18 Scott Cohn, Crop Insurance Set to Expand Despite Growing Fraud Worries, CNBC
(June 21, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47903496/Crop_Insurance_Set_to_Expand_Despite
_Growing_Fraud_Worries.
19 Id.
20 Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection for America’s Farmers, 46
CREIGHTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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as a civil remedy for crop insurance fraud and misrepresentations, in at
least one case, alleged material misrepresentations concerning crops and
crop insurance in balance sheets submitted to a judgment creditor in a
bankruptcy proceeding excepted a claim from discharge in bankruptcy.21
Despite the presence of criminal and civil remedies for crop insur-
ance fraud and misrepresentations, the current magnitude of fraud and
abuse in the federal crop insurance program reflects the need for more
aggressive action. This sort of action would further eliminate abuses to
help ensure the federal crop insurance program remains a vital source of
support for America’s farmers. In light of the significant issues of fraud
and misrepresentations in the federal crop insurance program, Part III
proposes several additional measures which can be implemented by leg-
islation and by judicial interpretation to further improve the integrity of
the program.
I. CROP INSURANCE FRAUD: A CONTINUING DILEMMA
The federal crop insurance program, in place since the Federal Crop
Insurance Act of 1938,22 protects America’s farmers by insuring crop losses
which private insurers otherwise are unlikely to insure in the absence of
reinsurance. The purpose of the Federal Crop Insurance Act is as follows:
It is the purpose . . . [of the Federal Crop Insurance Act] to
promote the national welfare by improving the economic
stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop in-
surance and providing the means for the research and expe-
rience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.23
Although a comprehensive discussion of the history of the federal
crop insurance program is beyond the scope of this Article,24 issues con-
cerning misrepresentations and fraud in the area of crop insurance have
appeared in reported cases even before the passage of the FCIA.25 Today,
21 In re Schnuelle, 441 B.R. 616, 624–25 (8th Cir. 2011).
22 Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
23 7 U.S.C. § 1502 (2012).
24 See, e.g., Steve Cooper, Note, Crop Insurance in the Age of Biotechnology: Should Federal
Crop Insurance Endorse Biotechnology?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 495 (2009); Steffen N. Johnson,
A Regulatory ‘Waste Land’: Defining a Justified Federal Role in Crop Insurance, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 505 (1996).
25 See Rumbolz v. American Alliance Ins. Co. of N.Y., 61 S.D. 334 (1933); Bauer v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 51 N.D. 1 (1924).
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crop insurance fraud and misrepresentations continue to pose a significant
hurdle to the integrity of the federal crop insurance program.
A. The Issue of Fraud in Crop Insurance
One of the biggest issues facing federal crop insurance today is
fraud. One of the forms of fraud insurers have identified in numerous re-
ported cases involves misrepresentations in applications for insurance.26
Alleged misrepresentations in applications for crop insurance policies, often
relating to the extent of interests in an insured crop, or the existence of the
very crop itself, have appeared in reported cases.27 In some cases, farmers
have actually scattered foreign materials into fields in attempting to con-
vey damage by covered causes of loss, or have reportedly claimed that cer-
tain crops are planted in an area when the crops do not actually exist. In
one recent case, a North Carolina farmer collected more than $9 million in
dubious claims for years, including one instance when he allegedly directed
workers to scatter ice cubes and mothballs in a Tennessee tomato field in
order to show the plants were damaged by a hailstorm.28 In another, out
of Texas, an individual was reportedly convicted of fraud and spent approx-
imately one year in a federal penitentiary for filing a crop insurance claim
for cotton never planted.29
An estimated rate for crop insurance fraud is approximately five
percent,30 but as a federal program, which currently costs approximately $7
billion per year, fraud and abuse could cost approximately in the hundreds
of millions per year.31 Faced with continued acts of abuse and fraud, the
government has responded with action in attempting to curb acts of fraud.
B. Contemporary Responses to Crop Insurance Fraud
1. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000
In 2000, the Agricultural Risk Protection Act promulgated sev-
eral measures intended to improve the integrity of the crop insurance
26 John Dwight Ingram, Misrepresentations in Applications for Insurance, 14 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 103 (2005–2006) (discussing reported cases).
27 See infra Part II.
28 Cohn, supra note 18.
29 John Burnett, Crop Insurance Program Ripe for Fraud, NPR (Nov. 15, 2005), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5012400.
30 Cohn, supra note 18.
31 Id.
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program.32 Professor Christopher Kelly’s excellent 2001 article in the
Drake Journal of Agricultural Law summarized many of the law’s key
provisions. It noted that the Act established a mechanism by which fed-
erally reinsured crop insurance providers can report suspected fraud and
abuse to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (“FCIC”).33 Professor
Kelly also remarked that if a provider suspects fraud or wrongdoing, it
can report the alleged misconduct to the FCIC and within ninety days, the
FCIC must respond with a written report describing its intended actions.34
If the FCIC declines to do so, the insurance provider can request the Farm
Services Agency to investigate the alleged misconduct.35
One of the key tenets of the Act was the creation of an enhanced
federal inspections regime to improve program compliance. A key issue in
insurance fraud generally is the problem of collusion between an insur-
ance agent or broker and an insured in attempts to defraud an insurer.36
Crop insurance is no different from other types of insurance. If an agent
or adjuster has claims which exceeds 150 percent of the average of claims
by all other agents and adjusters in the same geographical area, the FCIC
or Farm Service Agency can perform an audit of that agent or adjuster37
in order to combat the problem of collusion in crop insurance.
Professor Kelley also remarked that the Agriculture Risk Protection
Act provides for civil sanctions in the event a producer, agent, loss adjuster,
approved insurance provider or other person intentionally furnishes “false
or inaccurate information” to the FCIC or insurance provider which sells
federally reinsured crop insurance policies.38 As Professor Kelly notes, pen-
alties include either the greater of the amount of the pecuniary gain re-
ceived by the individual/entity as a direct result of the “false or inaccurate
information” furnished or $10,000.39 In addition, Professor Kelly also notes
32 Kelley, supra note 17, at 155.
33 Id. at 157.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Barbara Jo Call, Third-Party Problems with Falsified Insurance Applications, 24 TORT
& INS. L.J. 671, 677 (1988–1989) (“[T]he misrepresentations of an insurance agent may
be imputed to the insured by virtue of some conspiracy between the two. Although a col-
lusion defense technically requires ‘intentionally cooperative action’ between the insured
and the agent, the courts in many jurisdictions have found collusion without a common
plan to mislead the insurer.”).
37 7 U.S.C. § 1515(f)(1) (2012); see also H. Douglas Jose, The Impact of The Agricultural Risk
Protection Act of 2000 on Crop Insurance Programs, CORNHUSKER ECONOMICS (Jan. 24,
2001), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker/22.
38 Kelley, supra note 17, at 157; see 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h)(1) (2012).
39 Kelley, supra note 17, at 157; see 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h)(3)(A)(I, ii) (2012).
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that a producer who furnishes “false or inaccurate information” may be
disqualified from participation in the federal crop insurance program and
other agricultural programs for a period of up to five years.40 In one re-
cent decision, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia upheld an administrative law judges’ decision to impose a civil
fine of $5000 and disqualify an individual from certain federal programs
for two years in a case involving allegations where that individual
allegedly misrepresented ownership of tobacco and allegedly made a false
claim for insurance in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h).41
2. USDA Risk Management Agency, Data Mining and
Other Technology
In addition to the measures intended to fight fraud included within
the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, crop insurers and the federal govern-
ment have increased utilization of technology to combat fraud. Insurers,
in general, utilize the technique of data mining to identify distinctive pat-
terns and discrepancies among claims.42 Data mining allows insurers to
search43 through databases in order to generate reports which can be of
assistance in a fraud investigation if alleged instances of fraud appear in
a repeated pattern or if there are multiple instances of suspected acts of
collusion among claimants and insurance agents or brokers.44
In the past decade, the Risk Management Agency of the United
States Department of Agriculture (“RMA”) has utilized data mining to
detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program.45
If a farmer who has federally reinsured crop insurance policies receives
40 Kelley, supra note 17, at 157; see 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h)(3)(B) (2012).
41 Porter v. United States, No. 1:10CV00026, 2011 WL 182108 (W.D. Va. 2011).
42 Fox, supra note 16, at 240 (“Data mining involves searching the information stored in
a database to reveal patterns, links and discrepancies that otherwise would have re-
mained uncovered or would have been uncovered only through an outlay of substantial
time and effort.”).
43 Id. at 240–41 (“Database programs provide for two types of searches: structured query
language, called SQL, and interactive. SQL uses a set of defined commands, usually found
with larger databases, and is relatively difficult to use. With interactive searches, the user
selects a search screen that contains the various fields available in that particular data-
base and types the search information, which is called a query, in the appropriate field on
the search screen.”).
44 Id. at 241–42.
45 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-256, CROP INSURANCE: SAVINGS WOULD
RESULT FROM PROGRAM CHANGES AND GREATER USE OF DATA MINING 25 (2012).
684 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:675
“anomalous” payments on claims that are higher or more frequent than
others in the same geographical area, the United States Department of
Agriculture notifies the farmer via a warning letter that their fields are
to undergo an inspection in the next growing season by the Farm Services
Agency, who then notifies the results to the RMA.46 Officials of the RMA
have reported that the warning letters have reduced total claims by an
estimated $838 million from 2001 to 2010, and that approximately two-
thirds of farmers who receive a warning letter reduce or stop filing claims
for at least two to three years following receipt of the letter.47
In addition, crop insurers utilize experts in the geographical sciences
and satellite technology to identify fraudulent claims. Utilizing technology
which blends GPS functions and imaging technology from medical tech-
nology, at least one independent contractor, who has assisted the USDA
and private crop insurers for nearly twenty years in investigations, ana-
lyzes satellite imagery and imaging to detect fraud.48 As GPS technology
continues to become more refined and advanced with each passing year,
a further expansion of the usage of satellite imaging to assist private crop
insurers and the government is foreseeable.
As fraud continues to remain a critical problem in crop insurance,
remedies currently exist under both criminal law and civil law to counter
false or inaccurate information, misrepresentations, and outright acts
of fraud.
II. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR CROP INSURANCE FRAUD
A. Criminal Remedies for Crop Insurance Fraud
A number of statutes make crop insurance fraud a federal crime.
The criminal statute of the False Claims Act makes it a crime to “make or
present” a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim to any person in the civil
service of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 287 states:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in
the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or
to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or
against the United States, or any department or agency
46 Id.
47 Id. at 26.
48 Cohn, supra note 18.
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thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudu-
lent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall
be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.49
While a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 may result in a defendant
being imprisoned for up to five years, a conviction of the use of mail deliv-
ered by the U.S. Postal Service in commission of a fraud against the FCIC
may result in a more stringent imprisonment.50 For instance, if an insured
under a federally reinsured crop insurance policy uses the U.S. Postal
Service to deliver documents relating to the intentional submission of a
false or fraudulent claim to the FCIC, then that individual may be guilty
of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 134151 and could be sentenced to imprison-
ment of up to twenty years.
Finally, the most stringent criminal penalties occur in the situation
where an insured, or a potential insured, knowingly makes a false state-
ment or report, or willfully overvalues any land property or security with
the intention to influence an action of the FCIC. This situation typically
occurs with loan and credit applications, but may result in up to a $1 mil-
lion fine and imprisonment of up to thirty years.52
A 2006 case, United States v. Kuehnemund, involved a federal
conviction of a potato producer for crop insurance fraud in the United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan.53 The case is
49 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
50 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The statute states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraud-
ulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom,
any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both.
52 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).
53 No. 05-1871, 2006 WL 3593436, at *1 (6th Cir. 2006).
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significant as it involved all three of the above-mentioned statutes. In the
Kuehnemund case, a Michigan potato producer was accused of making
false statements to various federally reinsured crop insurers concerning
the amount of potatoes he produced between 1994 and 1997.54 These false
statements were allegedly included in invoices, shipping orders, and bill-
ing statements, and were allegedly made with the intention to inflate his
baseline potato crop in order to receive higher crop insurance indemnities
for losses than he was entitled to receive.55 The defendant was convicted
and sentenced to eighty-seven months in federal prison.56
In appealing his conviction before the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the defendant in Kuehnemund argued that his mail fraud con-
viction should have been overturned because his insurance agent testified
at trial that he did not specifically inform his clients that he sent docu-
ments concerning federally reinsured crop insurance claims through the
United States Postal Service, and thus insufficient evidence existed to
uphold the convictions.57
In rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that it is “reasonably foreseeable” that an insurance agent or broker would
utilize the U.S. Postal Service to transmit the fraudulent documents of the
insured to the crop insurer issuing federally reinsured crop insurance
policies.58 This holding affirmed decisions in the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals59 and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals60 that it is foreseeable
that an insurance company would utilize the U.S. Postal Service system
in response to a fraudulent claim of an insured.
Kuehnemund is significant in conveying that, with regard to crop
insurance fraud and the false submission of a claim, mail fraud may
also be involved, resulting in the imposition of a more stringent criminal
penalty. Standing alone, the False Claims Act only provides for a five-
year sentence, but combined with mail fraud, there is more of a bite—one
who is guilty of mail fraud in the false submission of a crop insurance
claim may be sentenced for up to twenty years imprisonment. As criminal
penalties provide stringent remedies for crop insurance fraud, civil rem-




57 Id. at *2.
58 Id. at *3.
59 United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 1993).
60 United States v. Smith, 934 F.2d 270 (11th Cir. 1991).
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the misrepresentation doctrine of insurance law, also currently provide
deterrence to the commission of acts of misrepresentation or fraud.
B. Civil Remedies for Crop Insurance Misrepresentations
and Fraud
1. False Claims Act
In addition to the civil penalties discussed earlier which were codi-
fied into law as part of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, the False
Claims Act also provides a civil remedy to the government against those
who present, or cause to present, a false claim for payment or approval,
or present or cause to present records or statements material to a false
claim to an officer or employee of the government.61 The False Claims Act
provides for a significant civil remedy—a monetary fine of not less than
$5000 and not more than $10,000—and treble damages of the amount of
loss the government sustained as a result of the false claim.62
United States v. Hawley is an interesting case which involved col-
lusion between an insurance agent and insureds to allegedly defraud the
FCIC. In Hawley, an insurance agent allegedly signed and submitted crop
insurance applications on behalf of at least two farmers which contained
representations that the farmers held an insurable interest in the crops,
when none actually existed.63 The government brought forth claims against
the insurance agent based upon the False Claims Act, among other claims,
alleging that the agent knowingly caused farmers who were not entitled to
receive multi-peril crop insurance coverage to receive not only coverage,
but also payments from a federally reinsured crop insurer, which the FCIC
reimbursed.64 At least two of the farmers who had received payments were
prosecuted for federal crop insurance fraud and entered pretrial diversion
agreements.65 At the trial court level, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa granted summary judgment for the insur-
ance agent on the 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) False Claims Act claim, reasoning
that the plain language of the statute required a claim to be presented to
an officer or employee of the government, not the federally reinsured crop
insurer.66 In the case, the government had only proffered evidence that
61 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
62 Id.
63 United States v. Hawley, 619 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Hawley II].
64 Id. at 890.
65 Id. at 889.
66 United States v. Hawley, 544 F. Supp. 2d 787 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
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the insurance agent presented false claims to the federally reinsured crop
insurer, but not actually directly to the FCIC.67
On appeal before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the govern-
ment contended that although the insurance agent did not physically
present the false claims to the FCIC, the agent caused the claims to be
presented.68 The government argued the sequences of events below created
a False Claims Act claim which should have been submitted to the jury:
(1) [The insurance agent] signed and submitted crop insur-
ance applications and acreage reports in the names of farm-
ers who were not eligible for such policies; (2) [The private
crop insurer] issued federally reinsured policies to those
farmers on the basis of those documents; (3) the farmers
filed claims with [the private crop insurer] for losses to the
insured crops; (4) [The private crop insurer] paid the farm-
ers for the claimed losses; and (5) [The private crop insurer],
in turn, submitted electronic requests for reimbursements
to the FCIC in the amounts that [the private crop insurer]
paid to the farmers.69
In essence, the government contended that the claims presented to
the FCIC for the purposes of the False Claims Act statute were the claims
of reimbursements to the FCIC submitted by the private crop insurer.70
In reversing the summary judgment decision at the trial court level and
finding that an issue of fact existed as to the presenting of a claim, the
Court of Appeals focused on the fact the government submitted the testi-
mony of an official of the USDA that an electronic data communication
from a private crop insurer to the FCIC triggers a release of funds from the
FCIC to an escrow account at a bank where a farmer can obtain payment
on a crop insurance claim.71
The Hawley decision is a key decision whose effect will likely lead
to more 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) False Claims Act claims surviving early
dispositive motions. By rejecting the standard that the government must
proffer proof of a false communication directly to the FCIC, the Eighth
Circuit’s decision has the effect of retaining the False Claims Act as an
67 Id.
68 Hawley II, supra note 63, at 892.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 893–94.
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effective remedy at deterring crop insurance fraud and expanding civil
liability into a broader range of cases, not only those that involve direct
communications between an insured or insurance agent to the FCIC. In
addition to the False Claims Act as a civil remedy against crop insurance
fraud, the misrepresentation doctrine of insurance law also protects pri-
vate crop insurers from acts of misrepresentation and fraud.
2. Misrepresentation Doctrine
The intentional, purposeful or knowing material misrepresentation
in an application or supporting documents associated with the procure-
ment of a policy of insurance is a fairly common occurrence in the area of
insurance.72 In the area of crop insurance, such misrepresentations are
often associated with the misrepresentation of insurable interests in the
crop to be insured and reinsured by the FCIC. In some instances, as the
Hawley case above demonstrates, material misrepresentations may result
in the imposition of criminal liability.73 In addition, through the misrepre-
sentation doctrine discussed below, such material misrepresentations often
void a crop insurance policy.
Under the misrepresentation doctrine of insurance law generally,
civil relief of the avoidance of the policy is available to an insurer who can
prove that an insured intended a fraudulent misrepresentation of material
fact which appears in an application or supporting documents of a policy
or policies of insurance.74 Professors Robert Keeton and Alan Widiss sum-
marize the contemporary doctrinal rule concerning an insurer’s right to
relief under the misrepresentation doctrine of insurance law as follows:
An insurer is entitled to relief on the basis that an insured
provided incorrect information in an insurance applica-
tion, when it is proved (1) that the information was not
correct, (2) that the information received was important
either to the insurer’s decision to insure or to the terms
of the insurance contract, (that is, the information was
“material”), and (3) that the insurer in fact relied on the
incorrect information.75
72 Ingram, supra note 26.
73 See supra Part II.B.1.
74 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 15, at 569–70.
75 Id. at 570.
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However, among individual jurisdictions there are variations of the
above-mentioned doctrinal rule. For instance, in some states a more re-
strictive standard for insurers to meet has been developed in that a mis-
representation is not “material” unless it increases the risk of loss for an
insurer,76 and in some states an insurer not only is required to prove that
a misrepresentation is made knowingly false, but also that it was made
with the intent to deceive.77
In the area of crop insurance, the misrepresentation doctrine has
appeared in reported cases even prior to the advent of the Federal Crop
Insurance Act in the 1930s and has been a longstanding civil remedy for
private crop insurers. One of the early cases, Berglund v. State Farmers’
Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Waseca, Minnesota, was decided by
the Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1913.78 Berglund involved a hail loss
incurred on an insured crop in 1910 and the dispute at issue concerned the
indemnity amount owed under the policy.79 The plaintiff argued for the full
amount, and the insurer contended the insured was only due the amount
reflecting a one-half interest in the insured crop.80
Judgment was awarded for the plaintiff for the full amount under
the policy at the trial court level on a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings.81 However, on appeal the insurer raised the defense proferred in its
answer to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that the insured al-
legedly misrepresented the extent of the interest under the insured crop.82
Given the general rule that an answer to a motion for a judgment on the
pleadings is to be construed liberally with all reasonable inferences in its
favor, the Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.83
Another early case from the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
1933, Rumbolz v. American Alliance Insurance Company of New York,
76 Ingram, supra note 26, at 105 (“In some states a misrepresentation will not be deemed
material unless it increases the risk of loss. This is a more restrictive standard for the in-
surer because a fact may be material to that insurer even though it does not demonstrably
increase the risk of loss.”).
77 Id. at 105 (“In some states, an insurer wishing to rescind or deny a claim must meet
a difficult standard. In addition to proving materiality, an insurer must also prove that
the misrepresentation was knowingly false, and sometimes he or she must exceed the
knowingly false standard and establish that it was made with intent to deceive.”).
78 142 N.W. 941, 942 (N.D. 1913).
79 Id. at 942.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 941–42.
82 Id. at 942–43.
83 Id. at 943.
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involved the question of whether an insured misrepresented on an insur-
ance application that crops which were to be insured against hail damage
were not damaged by hail prior to the completion of the insurance appli-
cation and issuance of the policy.84 The trial court in the case had entered
a judgment for the insured and denied the insurer’s motion for new trial.85
In reversing the judgment for the insured, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota found that the issue of disclosure of any previous or actual damage
by hail prior to the issuance of the policy was material.86
The question of whether or not a misrepresentation is “material”
is one that has appeared in crop insurance litigation. If a misrepresenta-
tion involves a fact essential to a crop insurance company’s determina-
tion of the assessment of the insurability of a risk, then courts are more
likely to find a misrepresentation “material.”87 In Parks v. Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation, six Indiana farmers were issued crop insurance
policies directly by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to cover corn
crops for the 1965 crop year.88 The corn crops suffered damage during the
crop year due to drought, and the farmers brought suit against the FCIC
after it denied coverage on the basis of alleged material misrepresentations
concerning the farmers’ interests in the crop.89
In Parks, the plaintiff farmers apparently did not disclose to the
FCIC during the underwriting process certain contracts made with an
agricultural association which essentially provided the farmers with hy-
brid seed corn, compensation for production of certain levels, and labor in
exchange for satisfactorily planting and harvesting the crop and keeping
the seed and crop the property of the association at all times.90
84 249 N.W. 316 (S.D. 1933).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 317 (“In an application for hail insurance made for the purpose of informing the
insurer of facts pertaining to the crops sought to be insured and to furnish the insurer
with information upon which to act in accepting or rejecting the risk, disclosure as to pre-
vious and actual damage by hail is material. It is apparent that the defendant company
would not have issued the policy if it had been informed that plaintiff’s crops had been
materially damaged by hail.”).
87 Parks v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 416 F.2d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 1969).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 384–85.
90 Id. at 385. The Court stated as follows:
The controversy involves plaintiff’s individual, identical contracts with
the DeKalb Agricultural Association, under which the Association,
“desirous of engaging the land and services of the grower to raise corn
suitable for feed,” agreed to furnish: parent hybrid seed corn to be planted
on plaintiffs’ farms; a man to supervise the planting of the seed; and
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit contended that even if the farmers’ alleged nondisclosure of the
contracts with the agricultural association constituted a legal misrepre-
sentation, it was not “material” as the FCIC did not proffer any evidence
showing that the contracts would have influenced decisions concerning
issuance of the policies.91 In fact, the court stated that since the contracts
provided for a minimum compensation per acre for the farmers, any risk
that was incurred by the FCIC would be a “more attractive” risk and to the
FCIC’s benefit.92
The misrepresentation doctrine also can come into conflict with
other doctrines of contract law, such as an assignment. Such a fact pattern
was presented in the 2005 Eighth Circuit decision in Knoeplin Farms
General Partnership v. Heartland Crop Insurance, Inc.93 In Knoeplin
Farms, an individual had received a multi-peril crop insurance policy for
a 2002 winter-wheat crop from a federally reinsured private crop insurer
in September 2001.94 However, in July 2002, this same individual faced
allegations of a false claim from the government for underreporting a sun-
flower crop from approximately three years earlier, and entered into a
settlement agreement in which guilt was not admitted, but provided for
voluntary disbarment and disqualification from all FCIC programs during
the 2002 crop year.95
Following the issuance of the multi-peril crop insurance policy for
the 2002 wheat crop but prior to the entering into the settlement agree-
ment, an assignment was apparently entered by the individual in February
2012 transferring all interests in both the wheat crop and insurance into
another entity.96
labor for detasseling the resulting “female” corn plants to prevent self-
pollination. The Association also agreed to compensate the grower at the
rate of $100 per acre plus a premium of $1.25 per bushel for each bushel
of seed corn produced on the female acres in excess of 20 bushels per acre.
In return, the grower agreed to satisfactorily plant and harvest the crop,
and not to allow any person to acquire or obtain “even as much as one
kernel” of the seed corn. The contract provided that the seed furnished
and the seed corn raised therefrom, as well as the corn produced from the
male parent rows, remained at all times the property of the Association.
91 Id. at 840.
92 Id.
93 430 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2005).
94 Id. at 908–09.
95 Id. at 909.
96 Id. at 909, 911.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit Court held that the crop insurance policy issued in the case was
not void, but voidable at the option of the insurer.97 However, the assign-
ment from the individual to the other entity was held to be valid, and the
court noted a fundamental rule of contract law is that “an assignee’s
right is subject to a defense that the contract was voidable or unenforce-
able before the assignment” but also that “an assignee is not subject to
any defense by the obligor against the assignor that arises after notice
of the assignment.”98
Under the facts of the case, any defense the insurer had against
the entity which accepted the assignment did not arise until July 2002,
when the settlement agreement concerning voluntary disqualification and
debarment was entered into.99 However, the defense arose only after there
was notice of the assignment, and thus any insurer defense would be un-
available.100 Since there was no evidence of fraud with the assignment, it
was valid, and thus, the misrepresentation doctrine or any other doctrine
did not apply to void the assignment of indemnity.101
Despite the decisions in Parks and Knoeplin Farms, the misrepre-
sentation doctrine has operated to bar the insurance claims of insureds
who have allegedly misrepresented ownership interests in insured crops
to private crop insurances and the FCIC in a number of cases in the past
two decades. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of the FCIC
and upheld a claims denial in a case where the insured allegedly misrep-
resented ownership interest in a wheat crop in a 1993 decision.102 Most
recently, in Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee upheld
the voidance of a crop insurance policy in a case where an insured alleg-
edly had an insurable interest in a crop as an operator of a nursery busi-
ness, but allegedly did not disclose a substantial beneficial interest of other
family members in the insured crop.103 In another decision, although the
97 Id. at 911.
98 Id.
99 Knoeplin Farms General Partnership, 430 F.3d at 912.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Hermes v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., No. 92-3301, 1993 WL 26825 (10th Cir. 1993).
103 No. 4:09-cv-65, 2012 WL 1193407, *10 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). The Court reasoned as follows:
While it is true that the ownership of the crop would not have an impact
on the existence or amount of the loss when operating under a cata-
strophic coverage policy, the adjustment of the loss would certainly be
affected if the named insured was not truly the owner of the crop. The
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United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied an
insurer’s motion for summary judgment on a declaratory judgment claim
concerning alleged misrepresentations as to the ownership interest in an
insured’s corn crops, it upheld the insurer’s motion for summary judgment
concerning the lack of an insurable interest in the crops at issue.104
For the past century, the misrepresentation doctrine has served as
a civil remedy for the FCIC and crop insurers where an insured allegedly
misrepresents ownership interest and other material facts in an applica-
tion and supporting documents for insurance. While strong criminal and
civil penalties exist under current law to deter crop insurance fraud, as
discussed above, fraud still exists in the crop insurance program, and with
the debate over a new farm bill105 anticipated to occur in the forthcoming
months, action can be taken in 2013 and beyond to further eradicate fraud.
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO FURTHER COUNTER
CROP INSURANCE FRAUD
A. Legislation and the 2013 Farm Bill
As the year 2012 came to a close, anxiety for many individuals
within the United States was at higher levels due to the “fiscal cliff.”106 As
a “fiscal cliff” package cleared Congress for approval as 2013 began, in the
area of agriculture a deal was reached to extend most provisions of the
2008 farm bill and avert the “dairy cliff,” which would have likely resulted
in the doubling of the price of a gallon of milk for American consumers.107
A key congressional debate concerning a new five-year farm bill looms to
insurance company has a legitimate interest in determining whether
the amount of the claimed loss is accurate, which is informed by the rep-
utation of the crop owner and any past claims made. Therefore, if the
insured represented himself as the owner but the crops were instead
owned by someone else, the facts involved could be very different, and
the Court can conceive of ways in which this type of misrepresentation
could increase the insurance company’s risk of loss.
104 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Mills, No. 4:06-cv-01971-RBH, 2008 WL 2250256 (D. S.C. 2008).
105 Erika Bolstad, Old Farm Bill Extended as Special Interests Worry Anew about Future,
MCCLATCHY (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/01/04/179074/old-farm
-extended-as-special.html.
106 Galen Moore, Fiscal Cliff Anxiety Blamed for Drop in Consumer Confidence, BOSTON
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup
/2012/12/consumer-confidence-drop-fiscal-cliff.html.
107 Bill Tomson, Congress Averts ‘Dairy Cliff,’ WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578215652575653978.html.
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take place in 2013, which will determine the future of agricultural policy,
and may include changes in the federal crop insurance program.108
With the continuing debate over a new five-year farm bill and the
future of agriculture policy, a moment to improve the federal crop insur-
ance program by combating fraud has appeared. However, it appears that
no legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress or has been introduced
in the 113th Congress intended to curtail crop insurance fraud.109 Despite
the lack of legislation, there are a number of areas Congress can examine
to bolster the integrity of the program.
1. Civil Penalties
In 2000, Congress enacted stringent civil penalties for crop insur-
ance fraud and the providing of “false or inaccurate” information to the
FCIC or insurance provider which sells federally reinsured crop insurance
policies through the enactment of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act.110
As discussed earlier, Professor Kelley noted that two of the key provisions
in the Act provided for the imposition of civil penalties either in the amount
of the pecuniary gain made from the providing of false or inaccurate infor-
mation or $10,000 (whichever is greater),111 and possible disqualification
from participation in the crop insurance program for up to five years.112
In the wake of continued fraud in the crop insurance program and
changes in agriculture in the past decade, Congress can continue to combat
fraud through a reassessment of current civil penalty provisions. Within
the past decade, and for some time before that, commentators have noted
the rise of agribusiness in agriculture113 and the general decline of the
108 Mary Clare Jalonick, Associated Press, Farm Bill Extension Frustrates Farm Interests,
Evidence of Lost Congressional Clout, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com
/farm-bill-extension-evidence-lost-231747284.html.
109 A search utilizing the terms “crop insurance” was completed by the author on January 5,
2013 using the search form at http://beta.congress.gov, which yielded no bills addressing
crop insurance fraud.
110 Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 358 (2000).
111 Kelley, supra note 17, at 157; 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h)(3)(A)(I, ii) (2012).
112 Kelley, supra note 17, at 157; 7 U.S.C. § 1515(h)(3)(B) (2012).
113 See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural
Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 620 (2010) (stating
that “the face of farming in the United States has changed dramatically from the small
family farmer of the early part of the twentieth century to the large corporate industrial
producer of today. Between 1935 and 2002, the total number of U.S. farms declined by
70 percent while the total acreage of all farms remained the same. This trend was a con-
sequence of larger farms buying out smaller farms.”); Melanie J. Wender, Comment,
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“family farm.”114 Today, a farmer must be, in many ways a “jack of all
Goodbye Family Farms and Hello Agribusiness: The Story of How Agricultural Policy is
Destroying the Family Farm and the Environment, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 141 (2011);
Frank Morris, Administration Turns Eye Toward Big Agribusiness, NPR (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124604147; Joseph Weber, Will
Agribusiness Plow Under the Family Farm?, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 22, 2000), http://
www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/79114-will-agribusiness-plow-under-the-family
-farm?type=old_article.
114 Law review articles on the topic of the “family farm” include the following: Nicholas
A. Fromherz, The Case for a Global Treaty on Soil Conservation, Sustainable Farming, and
the Preservation of American Culture, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57 (2012); A. Bryan Endres et al.,
The Legal Needs of Farmers: An Analysis of the Family Farm Legal Needs Survey, 71
MONT. L. REV. 135 (2010); Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law:
A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 935 (2010); Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in a Post-Jones
World, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97 (2009); Anthony B. Schutz, Nebraska’s Corporate Farming
Law and Discriminatory Effects Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 NEB. L. REV.
50 (2009); Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 345 (2006); David W. Deal, Can an Unhappy Minority Shareholder Divide a Family
Farm? Oklahoma’s Good Cause Rule for Dissolution of a Family Farm Corporation, 29
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 661 (2004); Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, South Dakota
Amendment E Ruled Unconstitutional—Is There a Future for Legislative Involvement in
Shaping the Structure of Agriculture?, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285 (2004); Meredith Redlin
& Brad Redlin, Amendment E, Rural Communities and the Family Farm, 49 S.D. L. REV.
787 (2004); Susan E. Stokes & Christy Anderson Brekken, The Eighth Circuit Grants
Corporate Interests a New Weapon Against State Regulation in South Dakota Farm Bureau
v. Hazeltine, 49 S.D. L. REV. 795 (2004); Robert A. Coulthard, The Changing Landscape of
America’s Farmland: A Comparative Look at Policies Which Help Determine the Portrait
of Our Land—Are There Lessons We Can Learn From the EU?, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 261
(2001); Jon Lauck, After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of
“Freedom to Farm,” 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 3 (2000); Matthew M. Harbur, Anti-Corporate,
Agricultural Cooperative Laws and the Family Farm, 73 NEB. L. REV. 14 (1999); Steven C.
Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms—The Way Ahead, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1997); Jim
Chen & Edward S. Abrams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45
DRAKE L. REV. 361 (1997); Neil D. Hamilton, Reaping What We Have Sown: Public Policy
Consequences of Agricultural Industrialization and the Legal Implications of a Changing
Production System, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 289 (1997); Richard F. Prim, Minnesota’s Anti-
Corporate Farm Statute Revisited: Competing Visions in Agriculture, and the Legislature’s
Recent Attempt to Empower Minnesota Livestock Farmers, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 431 (1995);
Steven C. Bahls, Judicial Approaches to Resolving Dissension Among Owners of the Family
Farm, 73 NEB. L. REV. 14 (1994); Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers? Is
Industrialization Restructuring American Food Production and Threatening the Future
of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 613 (1994); Christopher R. Kelley,
Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 659 (1994);
Susan A. Schneider, Who Owns the Family Farm?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 689 (1994); Carol
Ann Eiden, The Courts’ Role in Preserving the Family Farm During Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings Involving FMHA Loans, 11 LAW & INEQ. 417 (1993); J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus
of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the United States, 44 MERCER L. REV. 763
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trades”—the farmer must not only know how to plant and harvest crops,
but must also understand the complexities of the commodities markets,
agricultural contracts,115 the principles of mechanics and engineering for
the proper operation of farm equipment, and must be familiar with tech-
nology, particularly the latest advances in GPS technology.116 Careers in
(1993); Richard F. Prim, Saving the Family Farm: Is Minnesota’s Anti-Corporate Farm
Statute the Answer?, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 203 (1993); Brian F. Stayton, A
Legislative Experiment in Rural Culture: The Anti-Corporate Farming Statutes, 59 UMKC
L. REV. 679 (1991); and Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Ethics and Economics of Right-to-
Farm Statutes, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (1986).
115 Law review articles discussing agricultural production contracts and grain contracts are
vast and varied in scope. See Peter F. Karney & John F. Fatino, The Surety Relationship in
the Agricultural Commodity Storage Context and Grain Indemnity Funds: A Jurisdictional
Survey, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 41 (2006); Keith G. Meyer, Kansas’s Unique Treatment of
Agricultural Liens, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1141 (2005); Jayashree B. Gokhalé, Hedge to Arrive
Contracts: Futures or Forwards, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 55 (2004); Joseph A. Miller, Contracting
in Agriculture: Potential Problems, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 57 (2003); J.W. Looney & Anita
K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts, Bad Faith, and Economically Faulty Contracts, 4 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 177 (1999); Glenn L. Norris et al., Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Textual Alternative, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 319 (1999); Edward M. Mansfield,
Textualism Gone Astray: A Reply to Norris, Davison, and May on Hedge to Arrive Contracts,
47 DRAKE L. REV. 745 (1999); Glenn A. Hegar, Jr., Adhesion Contracts, Debt, Low Returns
and Frustration—Can America’s Independent Contract Farmer Overcome the Odds?, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 213 (1998); Nicholas P. Iavacone, Arbitration, Expediency, and the Demise
of Justice in District Courts: Another Side of the Hedge-to-Arrive Controversy, 3 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 319 (1998); Jennifer Durham King & James J. Moylan, Hedge-to-Arrive
Contracts: Jurisdictional Issues Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
481 (1998); David C. Barnett, Jr., Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 153
(1997); Nicholas P. Iavarone, Understanding the Hedge-to-Arrive Controversy, 2 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 371 (1997); Neil D. Hamilton, State Regulation of Agricultural Production
Contracts, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1051 (1995); Christopher R. Kelley, Agricultural Produc-
tion Contracts: Drafting Considerations, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 397 (1995); Neil D. Hamilton,
Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer (and the Crop)?: Contract Production
and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. REV. 48 (1994); Keith D.
Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate Agriculture: Anticorporate Farming Statutes and
Production Contracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393 (1992); David C. Bugg, Crop Destruction and
Forward Grain Contracts: Why Don’t Sections 2-613 and 2-615 of the U.C.C. Provide More
Relief?, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 669 (1989); L. Leon Geyer, Farmers Who Sell Mortgaged Farm
Products and Don’t Tell; Buyers Who Buy Farm Products and Don’t Pay—An Electrifying
Solution, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 429 (1985).
116 This footnote is drawn from my personal knowledge of observation of family members
who farmed in my childhood and to this day. These two individuals, Gerald Marzen (the
author’s grandfather) and Dennis Marzen (the author’s father) introduced me to the
workings of an agricultural operation, and to this day I am deeply grateful to both for
inspiring an appreciation of agriculture. I also want to acknowledge my colleague at Florida
State University, Professor Darren Prum, as we have had several conversations concerning
agriculture and the complexity of agriculture in today’s world.
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agriculture are not “simple”—courts throughout the United States recog-
nize this in the holdings where a farmer has been held to be a “merchant”
in goods for the purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code.117
Despite recent struggles, and the many challenges posed by 2012’s
drought which enveloped most of America’s heartland,118 the national farm
economy overall remains in stable shape. And there are many positives.
Even despite the drought, net farm income from throughout the country
rose to approximately $122 billion in 2012, up from $117 billion a year
before.119 In addition, the price of farmland continues to rise—in Iowa,
the average price of an acre of farmland sits at approximately $6700 per
acre.120 In October 2012, an Iowa record was set as an 80-acre parcel of
land sold for approximately $21,900 per acre in northwest Iowa.121
With the general rise in agricultural assets, Congress should re-
assess the civil penalties for crop insurance fraud included within the
Agriculture Risk Protection Act in order to keep the penalties as an ef-
fective deterrent to fraud. One approach Congress can take to strengthen
the monetary penalties for the providing of false or inaccurate informa-
tion is to impose a monetary penalty that includes both the amount of the
pecuniary gain made from the providing of false or inaccurate information
in addition to a $25,000 penalty, rather than an either/or monetary penalty.
Such a monetary penalty provision would be more equitable. Under the
current penalties, for an individual who provides false or inaccurate infor-
mation to the FCIC or a federally reinsured crop insurance provider which
is in an amount over $10,000, then the monetary penalty would only be the
amount of the pecuniary gain. If that individual returns the pecuniary
gain, they end up at the same spot financially as if the misrepresentation
was not made. However, if an individual provides false or inaccurate in-
formation which results in a loss under $10,000, then that individual may
117 See Jan W. Henkel & Peter J. Shedd, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Is a
Farmer a “Merchant” or a “Tiller of the Soil”?, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 323 (1980) (discussing cases).
118 David Ariosto & Melissa Abbey, Historic Drought Puts over Half of U.S. Counties in
Disaster Zones, USDA says, CNN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/01/us/us
-usda-disaster-zones/index.html (reporting that in August 2012, over half of the counties
in the United States were designated as disaster zones by the United States Department
of Agriculture).
119 Ron Nixon & John Eligon, Across Corn Belt, Farmland Prices Keep Soaring, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/us/across-corn-belt-farmland-prices
-keep-soaring.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
120 Id.
121 Dan Piller, New Record Farm Sale: $21,900 Per Acre, DES MOINES REGISTER (Oct. 25,
2012), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/10/25/new-record-farm-sale
-21900-per-acre/article.
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be fined $10,000. Such a result is not equitable for the individual who pro-
vides false or inaccurate information which results in a loss under $10,000.
Another approach Congress can take to reduce fraud is to abso-
lutely bar repeat offenders of the “false or inaccurate information” provi-
sion from any participation in the federal crop insurance program. In the
area of criminal law, “three strikes” laws122 were heralded by proponents
122 See David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strikes” Laws
on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 557 (2000) (stating, “Perhaps one of the most popular measures purposed
during the early 1990s were ‘three strike’ laws under which a person convicted of three
serious felonies would automatically be locked up for extended period of time including
life without parole.”).
Legal scholarship concerning “three strikes” laws in the area of criminal law is vast.
See Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581 (2012); Michael Romano, Striking Back:
Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight Disproportionate Sentences Imposed Under California’s
Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 311 (2010); Anne Goldin, The California Three
Strikes Law: A Violation of International Law and a Possible Impediment to Extradition,
15 SW. J. INT’L L. 327 (2009); Robert G. Lawson, PFO Law Reform: A Crucial First Step
Toward Sentencing Sanity in Kentucky, 97 KY. L.J. 1 (2009); Naomi Harlin Goodno, Career
Criminals Targeted: The Verdict Is In, California’s Three Strikes Law Proves Effective,
37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 461 (2007); Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a
Wholesale Reform of California’s Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903
(2004); Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes’ Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2004);
Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was judicial Activism California’s
Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cruel and Unusual:
The Story of Leandro Andrade, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2003); Edwin J. Erler & Brian P.
Janiskee, California’s Three Strikes Law: Symbol and Substance, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 173
(2002); Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes
Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483 (2002); Alex Ricciardulli, The Broken Safety Valve:
Judicial Discretion’s Failure to Ameliorate Punishment Under California’s Three Strikes
Law, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2002); Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full
Deterrent Effect of California’s Two and Three Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159
(2002); Michael Vitiello, Somewhat Frantic: A Brief Response to Crime, Punishment and
Romero, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 615 (2002); Franklin E. Zimring & Sam Kamin, Facts, Fallacies
and California’s Three Strikes, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002); James A. Ardaiz, California’s
Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2000);
Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment and Romero: An Analysis of
the Case Against California’s Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (2000); Walter L.
Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
577 (1999); Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in California, 11 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 23 (1999); Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of
California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65 (1999);
Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County’s Three Strikes
Sentencing Practices from July–December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 29 (1999); Linda
S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop in California
Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101
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of tougher criminal laws nationwide to bar individuals who have committed
three serious felonies from ever receiving the possibility of parole. While
“three strikes” laws are controversial as to whether or not they actually
have a statistical effect in reducing crime,123 a rule of barring repeat of-
fenders as a civil penalty from participation in the federal crop insurance
program is nearly guaranteed to eliminate a barred individual from ever
committing any further acts of fraud in the federal crop insurance program.
2. Inspections and Random Audits
With the advancement of technology in the overall fight against
fraud, data mining has been a key tool in detecting anomalous claims pay-
ments and losses in the federal crop insurance program.124 Since 2001,
the RMA has contracted with the Center of Agribusiness Excellence, at
Tarleton State University in Texas, to identify lists of farmers with anom-
alous claim payments and insurance agents and adjusters with anomalous
losses.125 If a farmer with anomalous claim payments is identified, then
the RMA reports the name of the farmer on a list which is sent to the Farm
Services Agency of the USDA, which conducts two inspections—postplant-
ing and preharvest—for each crop insurance policy sold to the farmer.126
While it has been reported that the letters which are sent by the
FSA to farmers with anomalous claims payments have substantially
reduced total claims,127 it is a troubling finding of the GAO that not all
inspections called for by USDA guidelines are being completed. In 2009,
(1998); Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1
(1998); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997); Nkecha Taifa, “Three-Strikes-And-You’re-Out”—Mandatory Life
Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717 (1995).
123 See Emily Bazelon, Arguing Three Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/magazine/23strikes-t.html?pagewanted=all7_r=0.
124 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 11.
125 Id.
126 Id. The U.S. Government Accountability Office describes the inspections process
as follows:
Under USDA guidance, FSA county offices are to conduct two inspections
(postplanting and preharvest) for each policy these farmers hold. FSA
county offices are then to report to RMA on whether they inspected the
crop and, if so, whether the inspection determined that (1) the inspected
farmer’s crop was in good condition; (2) the inspected farmer’s crop was
not in good condition, but other farmers’ crops in the local area were in
good condition; or (3) the inspected farmer’s crop was not in good condi-
tion, and other farmers’ crops in the local were also not in good condition.
127 Id. at 26.
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approximately 20 percent of all field inspections called for by the USDA
guidelines concerning anomalous claims payments were not completed,
and in 2010 that figure crept up to 28 percent of all field inspections not
being completed.128
According to the GAO, one of the reasons for the high rate of non-
compliance with the USDA guidelines is that FSA state offices are not
required to monitor the completion of the field inspections, which are com-
pleted through county level FSA offices.129 While policymakers can man-
date the completion of all inspections, and provide for more funding to do
so,130 another possible approach policymakers can examine to combat fraud
is to implement a random inspection program of submitted claims by both
insureds and crop insurance agents and brokers, similar to what the IRS
utilizes for random audits of filed tax returns.131
In addition, another approach policymakers can take to combat
fraud is to implement regulations which require greater information shar-
ing between the federal government and federally reinsured private crop
insurers. Under current law, the RMA does not provide private insurers
with the field inspection results for fields in good condition, but fraudulent
or false claims may still possibly be submitted from fields with crops in good
condition.132 As the GAO recommends, facilitating the communication of 
128 Id. The U.S. Government Accountability Office noted:
In particular, in 2009 and 2010, RMA did not have field inspection re-
sults for 20 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of the fields for farmers
listed as having anomalous claim payments. Four states—California,
Colorado, Florida, and Texas—accounted for more than 40 percent of
the missing data. For example, in Florida, FSA inspected a field for 8 of
the 88 farmers with anomalous claim payments, according to our review
of RMA records. If FSA does not complete all field inspections requested
by RMA, not all farmers who have had anomalous claim payments will
be subject to a review, increasing the likelihood that fraud, waste, or
abuse may occur without detection.
129 Id. at 27.
130 Id. at 28 (One of the cited reasons for the relatively high rate of noncompliance with fed-
eral inspections in the GAO report is that insufficient resources have been allocated to FSA
to complete the inspections, and that the general workload in these offices has increased.).
131 Internal Revenue Service, IRS Audits, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses
-&-Self-Employed/IRS-Audits (last updated Feb. 11, 2013).
132 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 34–35. The Government
Accountability Office has stated:
RMA generally does not provide insurance companies with field inspec-
tion results for most FSA inspections—that is, those for fields in good
condition—but provides them with the field inspection results for a small
portion of the farmers—those with crops in worse condition than their
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the field inspection results from the RMA to private crop insurers will
undoubtedly bolster and assist the data mining activities of both the
RMA and private crop insurers to identify false and fraudulent claims.133
3. Crop Insurance Unit Structure
One of the key questions an agricultural producer must answer
when procuring crop insurance is determining what type of unit struc-
ture to select to insure the farming operation.134 There are several basic
types of structures—optional units, basic units, enterprise units, and
whole farm units.
The first type, optional units, allows a farmer to insure each farm
separately by either farm serial numbers or by section, township, or
range.135 In the basic unit structure, a producer can designate a basic unit
for all farmland owned or cash rented within a particular county.136 With
peers. However, inspection information on fields in good condition is
important—particularly for inspections that occurred shortly before a
claim was made. Past cases have revealed that some farmers may har-
vest a high-yielding crop, hide the sale of that crop, and report a loss to
receive an insurance payment. USDA’s Inspector General has reported
on the need to use FSA field inspection information to identify potential
fraud, waste, and abuse. For example, in 2009, the Inspector General
reported on two farmers on the list of farmers with anomalous claim
payments whose crops were in good condition, according to the FSA
inspection; however, these farmers filed nearly $300,000 in claims a short
time after an FSA inspection, and RMA did not notice the discrepancy.
RMA’s data mining contractor stated that it could, with a few days of
effort, provide all the FSA field inspection data to the insurance com-
panies, including those on crops in good condition, which represent the
bulk of inspections.
133 Id. at 36–37.
134 LEANNE LUNDY & CORY G. WALTERS, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY–COLLEGE OF
AGRICULTURE UK COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE, UNDERSTANDING CROP INSURANCE:
WHAT EVERY PRODUCER IN KENTUCKY NEEDS TO KNOW: AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
EXTENSION SERIES—2009-26 (2009), available at http://www.ca.uky.edu/cmspubsclass/files
/cgwalters/Understanding%20Crop%20Insurance.pdf.
135 Id.
136 William Edwards, Iowa State University Extension and Outreach, Proven Yields and
Insurance Units for Crop Insurance (March 2012), http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm
/crops/html/a1-55.html. Edwards describes the basic unit structure as follows:
Producers can designate a basic unit for all tracts of land they own and/
or cash rent within a county. They also receive one basic unit for all of
the land they share rent with a different landlord. For example, if a crop
is planted on land rented under a crop share lease with Mr. Smith, a
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the enterprise unit structure, a farmer can insure all acres of a particular
crop in a county as one policy unit.137 Finally, with the whole farm unit,
one policy insures all acres of all insured crops in a county.138
However, the optional unit structure, which is popular among
farmers,139 potentially invites the possibility of fraud.140 Apparently as
crop share lease with Mrs. Jones, and a cash rent lease with Black, Inc.,
and the remaining crop land is owned, the acreage would qualify as
three basic units . . . . There would be one basic unit with each crop share
owner, and one basic unit for the cash rented and owned land combined.
Each crop share landowner can also insure his/her own interest in the
crop as a separate unit.
Each different crop also creates a separate unit, and tracts of land in
different counties must be insured as separate units. Each crop can have
a different type of policy and level of coverage, and could receive an in-
demnity payment independent of the other units. Separate production
records must be kept for each basic unit. Insuring all acres as basic units
entitles producers to a 10 percent discount on their premiums.
137 Lundy & Walters, supra note 134 (Lundy & Walters note that there are four require-
ments which must be met in order for a producer to have an enterprise unit structure:
“[1)] 2 or more basic or optional units of same insured crop located in 2 Farm Serial
Numbers or section/township/range; [2)] All acres must be on acreage report; [3)] The
basic/optional units must each have insurable acreage of the same crop; [and 4)] Insured
must comply with reporting provisions for enterprise unit.”).
138 Id.
139 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 05801-2-AT, REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY ON FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE REFORM 6 (1999), available at http://www.usda
.gov/oig/webdocs/cropsins.pdf (stating that “FCIC instructions allow land that would other-
wise be one basic unit to be divided into optional units. For land to be eligible for unit
division, (1) producers must have independently verifiable planting, production, and
harvesting records necessary for determining the production guarantee for the optional
units, and (2) a clear and discernible break must occur at the boundaries of the optional
units. Optional units enable producers to separately insure various segments or portions
of their overall operation and to receive indemnity payments if some of those units have
losses even though others may have production equal to or greater than the guarantee.
Generally, combining units on multiple unit policies will reduce the amount of indemnity
paid, while separating the units will increase the possibility of an insurable loss.”).
140 Joseph A. Atwood et al., Estimating the Prevalence of Yield-Switching Fraud in the
Federal Crop Insurance Program, 88 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 365, 379–80 (2006) (concluding
in a study that “multiple unit crop insurance provisions provide incentives for some pro-
ducers to consider switching yields between separately insured tracts of land so as to
generate larger insurance indemnifications . . . . the statistical procedures used are not
intended by the authors to be viewed as proof of fraudulent conduct on the part of any
individual or group of insurers. Proof of illicit conduct requires detailed and careful on-
site investigation. However, we believe that the procedures presented in this article can
provide a useful screening device by more efficiently focusing the efforts of crop adjustors
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far back as 1999, the United States Department of Agriculture’s Office of
Inspector General utilized the strong terminology of “moral hazard risk”141
to describe the optional unit policy.142 Under the optional unit structure,
the possibility exists that a farmer could “yield-switch” the crop production
from one insured unit into another insured unit, or possibly even conceal
the crop production from a unit in order to fraudulently receive a higher
indemnity payment.143 Such conduct has been strongly indicated by at
least one audit conducted by the USDA Office of Inspector General144 and
the Inspector General recommended that the RMA should consider re-
scinding the optional unit policy.145
Despite this recommendation over a dozen years ago, the optional
unit policy still continues to exist in the area of federally reinsured crop
insurance. One option policymakers can take in this year’s farm bill to re-
form the crop insurance program is to follow the recommendation of the
USDA Office of Inspector General and eliminate the optional unit struc-
ture from federally reinsured crop insurance contracts, as well as the basic
unit structure, and allow federally reinsured crop insurers only to utilize
enterprise units or whole farm units as a unit structure. Although the uti-
lization of the enterprise unit and whole farm unit likely will not eliminate
all fraud concerning unit structures in the federal crop insurance program,
it will help to reduce those potential situations in which a producer could
“yield switch” and transfer crop production from one insured optional
unit into another optional unit in the same county, and be yet another
step in the restoring of the integrity of the program.
and agency compliance personnel on the smaller subset of the population who are more
likely to have participated in suspicious conduct.”).
141 Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 84 (2001) (Beal describes
the history of the concept “moral hazard” as follows: “In its infancy, the word ‘hazard’
referred to a game of dice that survives today in a simplified version: craps. Early in-
surers identified two kinds of hazards—those that caused a loss, e.g., fires, and those that
affected the likelihood or amount of a loss. Later, in an attempt to avoid underwriting poor
risks, insurers used the phrase ‘moral hazard’ at shorthand to describe the undesirable
traits in an insured that might increase the probability of a loss.”).
142 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 139.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 26–27 (stating that in one audit of claims involving the optional unit structure,
the Office of Inspector General “found that producers were paid indemnities on optional
units that did not meet the criteria which allow basic units to be divided into optional units.
Specifically, producers were not able to provide supporting documentation that showed
from which optional units the production actually was harvested. As a result, the optional
unit must be combined back into the basic unit structure and the loss computed on the
basic unit.”).
145 Id. at 27.
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4. Crop Insurance and an Insurer Defense for “Bad Faith” Claims
Just as insurance “bad faith” claims have appeared in the fields of
auto insurance, disability insurance, and bodily injury claims, bad faith
claims have arisen in the area of crop insurance where private crop in-
surers have allegedly acted with intentional or reckless disregard of the
rights of an insured.146 While a discussion of the presence and availability
of the crop insurance bad faith remedy is beyond the scope of this article,
academic research indicates that the presence of the insurance bad faith
remedy may have an effect of leading insurers to immediately pay claims
they otherwise would have investigated further if there was arguably a
reasonable basis for investigation in order to avoid the possibility of incur-
ring a multimillion dollar judgment for insurance bad faith.147 For example,
Professor Sharon Tennyson and Professor William J. Warfel have stated
that insurance bad faith reduces the incentives for insurance companies
to strategically delay or outright deny payment of claims otherwise valid
and that it also places limitations on the usage of claim denial or under-
payment as a strategy to deter insurance fraud.148 This is likely to take
place also in the context of private crop insurers and their investigations
of suspected acts of fraud in the federal crop insurance program. In addi-
tion, despite the general rule that an insurer must generally further inves-
tigate an insurance applicant’s representations if there are reasons to
question the veracity of the representations,149 private crop insurers may
also be less likely to investigate potential fraud since the government re-
insures many of the losses suffered by private crop insurers.150
To balance these incentives and conditions which possibly make
it more likely that a private crop insurer will fully accept an otherwise
legally questionable and possibly fraudulent claim, courts should be better
cognizant of instances where insurers may be technically in violation of an
unfair claims settlement practice statute, but otherwise act in good faith.
Academic commentators have recognized the importance of “good faith”
conduct. Victor Schwartz and Christopher Appel have contended that
courts should only recognize insurance bad faith where an intentional or
reckless act by an insurer occurs, but if any other violation—including
146 Marzen, supra note 20.
147 Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, The Law and Economics of First-Party Insurance
Bad Faith Liability, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 203, 240 (2009).
148 Id. at 221.
149 Ingram, supra note 26, at 114.
150 Cohn, supra note 18.
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technical violation—of an unfair claims settlement practice statute occurs,
exclusive jurisdiction over such a claim should reside with a state insur-
ance regulatory authority.151
In the crop insurance context, courts should certainly recognize the
importance of good faith investigation of questionable claims by private
crop insurers. In future cases involving crop insurance bad faith liability,
the courts not only should adopt the Schwartz and Appel standard and rec-
ognize bad faith only where an intentional or reckless act of a private crop
insurer occurs,152 but also afford a defense to the claim if the claimant has
received a “warning letter” from the USDA in the previous ten years for an
“anomalous” claim payment. While “false positives” have been reported
with the USDA warning letter program,153 the receipt of such a letter by
a claimant would reasonably place a private crop insurer on notice that
potential fraud may have occurred. Thus, the private crop insurer should
be afforded the opportunity to reasonably investigate the claim without
the threat of a crop insurance bad faith claim barring the commission of
an intentional or reckless act during the claims investigation process.154
Such a rule would likely encourage private crop insurers to investigate
151 Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Common Sense Construction of Unfair
Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1477, 1530 (2009). Schwartz and Appel also noted:
If bad-faith law continues on its present course, the implications are
adverse to all parties’ interests. Responsible and ethical insurers will
find it harder to differentiate from one another and compete, claimants
will be more susceptible to dishonest acts, and the system costs will con-
tinue to increase, harming all consumers. Also troubling, consumers may
perceive an insurer’s inundation of bad-faith claims and resulting high
verdicts as an ordinary industry practice. They may become apathetic to
an insurer’s service reputations, severely inhibiting the market system’s
repudiation of bad insurers, and they may differentiate insurers only
with regard to price. Worse, consumers might begin to tolerate bad faith
as inherent to the insurance business, perpetuating the flow of improper
litigation and exacerbating biases against insurers.
152 Id.
153 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 12 (stating that, “The RMA
contractor’s data mining reports identify individual farmers with anomalous claim pay-
ments or insurance agents and adjusters with anomalous losses, but these anomalies only
indicate potential cases of fraud, waste, or abuse. These claims and losses may be legiti-
mate, resulting from unusual weather or other conditions on a farm. As such, a portion
of each list inevitably represents ‘false positives’—farmers whose claims were valid. To
determine if there is actual fraud, waste, or abuse, RMA or the insurance company must
engage in additional review.”).
154 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 151.
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potential fraud to better maintain the overall integrity of the crop insur-
ance program.
CONCLUSION
The imperfect nature of the human condition unfortunately means
that fraud in commercial transactions will likely never be fully eradicated.
Crop insurance will probably not to be an exception. The historic drought
of 2012,155 the possible filing of a record number of crop insurance claims,156
and the continued debate over a new farm bill157 have brought the issues
concerning crop insurance to the national spotlight in recent months.
However, this moment in the national spotlight offers an opportunity to
improve the federal crop insurance program for the better by discussing
measures to further combat crop insurance fraud, and to ensure that this
generation and future generations of farmers are able to count on a vibrant
and healthy federal crop insurance program.
155 Ariosto & Abbey, supra note 118.
156 Ben Berkowitz & Tom Polansek, Record Number of Farmers Expected to File Crop
Insurance Claims, INS. J. (July 20, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national
/2012/07/20/256578.htm.
157 Charles Abbott, Critics Call for More Cuts in Farm Bill, Crop Insurance, INS. J. (Dec. 10,
2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/12/10/273412.htm.
